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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. ] 
R. CRAWFORD DAVIS and WILLIAM ] 
G. DYER, individually, and as 
General Partners for REAL 
ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS 
Defendants/Respondents. 
i Appeal No. 2 09 60 
i Category No. 13(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether venue is proper for a tort action in a 
county other than where the cause of action arises or in 
the county in which any defendant resides at the 
commencement of the action. 
2. Whether a prayer for quiet title relief, standing 
alone, is sufficient to confer proper venue on an action 
where none of the elements of a quiet title action are 
otherwise alleged or claimed in the complaint. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, pro se, filed his eight-paragraph 
Complaint against defendants in the Sixth District Court of 
the State of Utah. All parties, however, are residents of 
Utah County, State of Utah. While plaintiff's Complaint is 
difficult to follow, it sounds exclusively in tort. A copy 
of plaintiff's Complaint is attached to this Brief in the 
Addendum. 
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint 
based upon improper venue and lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction inasmuch as a similar action was pending 
before Judge Ballif in the Fourth District Court, Civil No. 
63025. 
On October 8, 1985, the lower court granted 
defendants' Motion. Rather than refiling his case in the 
Fourth District, plaintiff pursued this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant is a resident of Utah County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Respondents are residents of Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
3. Real Estate Development Consultants ("REDC") is a 
Utah Limited Partnership, and is the undisputed owner of 
the real property in question. 
4. An action is currently pending between the 
parties herein in the Fourth District Court, Civil No. 
63025. That action has yet to be concluded pending a 
decision of the court regarding the proper method of 
distributing partnership assets. It is this identical 
- 2 -
relief that appellant sought the Sixth District Court to 
provide, in effect bringing the same issue before two 
courts. A copy of respondents1 Memorandum pending before 
the Fourth District is attached hereto in the Addendum as 
evidence of the ongoing conflict in the Fourth District 
Court. 
5. In his Complaint, which is the subject of this 
Appeal, appellant alleges that respondents wrongfully 
removed him as general partner of REDC. All of appellantfs 
claims sound in tort, although appellant prays for title in 
the land to be quieted to him, personally, despite the fact 
that title to the property indisputably lies in a Utah 
limited partnership, REDC. 
6. Because there were no allegations to support a 
quiet title action, and because a similar case was pending 
before the Fourth District, the lower court dismissed 
plaintiff's Complaint. This Court should affirm the lower 
court's decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Venue on a tort action is proper only in the 
county where the cause of action arises, or in the county 
in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the 
action. Utah Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1977). While 
appellant's Complaint is difficult to follow, it clearly 
sounds entirely in tort. Since the cause of action, if 
any, arises in the Fourth District, and since all 
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respondents reside in the Fourth District, venue is 
therefore proper only in the Fourth District. 
Appellant has attempted to circumvent the venue 
statute by asking the court, in his prayer for relief, to 
quiet title to him personally. However, appellant did not 
allege any facts in his Complaint upon which to support a 
claim for a quiet title action, much less make a prima 
facie case for a quiet title action. The simple fact is 
that the limited partnership, REDC, has title to the 
property, and that fact is not disputed. Therefore, 
because appellant has absolutely failed to meet a prima 
facie case for a quiet title action, venue is not proper in 
the Sixth District. 
Moreover, identical issues requested by appellant 
for resolution are currently pending before the Fourth 
District Court for the State of Utah. Thus, the Sixth 
District Court for the State of Utah does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to resolve those same issues. 
Finally, respondents allege that appellant's 
appeal is frivolous or otherwise brought only for the 
purposes of delay. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, respondents pray for damages as 
are just, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Indeed, 
pursuant to Rule 10(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this Court could, upon its own motion, 
summarily affirm the lower court's judgment since it 
plainly appears that the appellant has not presented a 
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substantial question for review by this Court. If the 
appellant had been genuinely concerned about the merits of 
his case, he could have simply, and expeditiously, refiled 
his case in the Fourth District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMED VENUE IS IMPROPER SINCE 
VENUE FOR TORT CLAIMS LIES EXCLUSIVELY IN THE 
COUNTY WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES, OR IN 
THE COUNTY IN WHICH ANY DEFENDANT RESIDES AT 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. 
Venue for tort actions is controlled by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1977) as follows: 
In all other cases, the action must be 
tried in the county in which the cause of 
action arises, or in the county in which 
any defendant resides at the commencement 
of the action . . . . 
It is undisputed that all parties to this action 
are current residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
Further, the acts of which appellant complains occurred, if 
at all, in Utah County, State of Utah. Therefore, venue 
for any tort action claimed by appellant must lie in Utah 
County, State of Utah, and not in Kane County. 
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POINT II: 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ALL SOUND IN TORT. 
A. Each Paragraph of Appellant's Complaint 
Alleges, At Best, A Tort Action. 
A brief review of each paragraph of appellant's 
Complaint reveals that appellant's claims sound entirely in 
tort. 
1. PARAGRAPH THREE of the Complaint alleges that 
defendants performed "certain illegal acts," namely 
"contracting with third parties for the sale of [REDC] 
partnership property without legal authority to do so." 
Plaintiff's claim is clearly, if anything, a tort action. 
2. PARAGRAPH FOUR of the Complaint alleges that the 
defendants "have jeopardized the financial interests of the 
plaintiff." Just how defendants have jeopardized the 
plaintiff's financial interests is unclear from paragraph 
four, but clearly paragraph four alleges, if anything, a 
tort. 
3. PARAGRAPH FIVE of the Complaint expressly refers 
to the civil action pending between the parties in the 
Fourth District Court, Civil No. 63025. Despite being a 
party himself to that action, appellant claims that 
respondents have allowed matters in that court "to 
languish." Appellant further alleges that respondents 
"presumed, in the meantime, the right to appoint themselves 
as the general partners." Again, appellant's allegations 
can only be construed, in a light most favorable to 
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appellant, as a claim for the wrongful removal of appellant 
as a general partner of REDC, a tort action, if anything. 
4. PARAGRAPH SIX of the Complaint apparently alleges 
that the defendants made "certain misrepresentations," not 
to the appellant but to other, unnamed "limited partners." 
Again, even assuming appellant had standing to assert this 
claim, the claim obviously sounds in tort. 
5. PARAGRAPH SEVEN of the Complaint claims that the 
respondents intend to distribute partnership assets "in a 
manner different than the partnership agreement provides, 
or that state statute dictates. . . . " Clearly appellant's 
allegation is, if anything, a tort claim. More 
importantly, however, is the fact that this particular 
claim is not ripe for any type of adjudication inasmuch as 
appellant only fears that respondents intend to take 
some type of action. No claim is made that any such action 
has actually been taken by respondents. 
6. PARAGRAPH EIGHT of the Complaint alleges that the 
limited partnership REDC owes appellant a substantial 
amount of money which is past due and payable. Clearly, 
the allegations in paragraph eight do not support a claim 
for a quiet title action, but can only be construed, at 
best, as some type of tort or contract action. 
7. PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO of the Complaint simply 
state that the parties are residents of the State of Utah, 
and that the real property owned by the limited partnership 
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REDC is located in Kane County, State of Utah. No other 
allegations are made in these two paragraphs. 
Without any doubt, the allegations contained in 
appellant's Complaint sound exclusively in tort, if at 
all. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-13-7, 
venue can only be proper in Utah County. 
B. Appellant's Complaint Contains No 
Allegations to Support a Prima Facie for 
a Quiet Title Action. 
A complaint or petition to quiet title, or to 
remove a cloud on a title, should contain, at least, the 
following elements: 
1. An accurate description of the property involved; 
2. Plaintiff's title or interest in the property; 
3. Plaintiff's possession if in possession; 
4. Defendant's wrongful possession if plaintiff is 
not in possession and defendant is in possession; 
5. The fact that the defendant is claiming an 
interest adverse to the plaintiff; 
6. That the defendant has no right, title, or 
interest in the property involved; 
7. Facts sufficient to justify the granting of 
relief; and, 
8. A prayer for relief. 
BYU J. of Legal Studies, "Summary of Utah Real Property 
Law," 13 (1978). 
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As seen from a review of the allegations in 
appellant's Complaint, appellant has not alleged any facts 
to support a claim for quiet title. Most importantly, 
there is no claim or allegation that plaintiff personally 
has title to the real property in question. Rather, it is 
undisputed that the limited partnership REDC has title to 
the property. This weakness alone is dispositive of 
appellant's claim for a quiet title action. The mere fact 
that appellant has prayed for the relief of quiet title, 
without anything else, is simply not sufficient to confer 
venue or jurisdiction upon the Sixth District Court. 
For all of the above reasons, the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
POINT III: 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT. 
In paragraph seven of appellant's Complaint, 
appellant alleges that the respondents "indicated they 
intend to distribute partnership assets in a manner 
different than the partnership agreement provides or that 
state statute dictates . . . ." That issue is clearly 
pending before the Fourth District Court for the State of 
Utah as evidenced by respondent's Memorandum in that 
court. A copy of respondent's Memorandum in the lower 
court is attached to the Addendum. Clearly, the lower 
court could not rule on this issue since it was currently 
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pending before the Fourth District Court. This same issue 
is also intertwined with the allegations made by the 
appellant in paragraph eight of his Complaint. Moreover, 
it is inconceivable that the Sixth District Court could 
rule on the allegation that respondents permitted the 
matter in the Fourth District Court "to languish." 
Clearly, these items were not properly presented to the 
Sixth District Court for adjudication, and the lower 
court's Order of Dismissal in this regard should be 
affirmed. 
POINT IV: 
RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE AWARDED DAMAGES 
ON THIS APPEAL. 
If the appellant had been truly concerned about 
the merits of his case, he could have simply, 
inexpensively, and expeditiously refiled his case in the 
Fourth District Court. To delay this matter for years 
through an appeal to this Court is clearly not warranted 
under the circumstances. Respondents urge, therefore, that 
pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this Court award respondents just damages of single or 
double costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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POINT V: 
THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT 
SINCE IT PLAINLY APPEARS THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL 
QUESTION IS PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
In the present case, the lower court's ruling has 
not impaired in any way the appellant's case as to the 
merits. The lower court simply ruled that the appellant 
must file his case in a different jurisdiction. Clearly, 
this is not a "substantial question" for this Court to rule 
on. Further, this Court's summary affirmation of the lower 
court would not impair appellant's case in any way. 
Rather, such ruling would expedite a proper resolution of 
the allegations made by the appellant, reducing the time 
and costs involved for all parties while lessening the 
burden on the judicial system. Respondents urge this 
Court, therefore, to view this appeal in light of Rule 
10(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
A paragraph by paragraph review of appellant's 
Complaint clearly shows that the claims have not been 
properly presented to the Sixth District Court of the State 
of Utah. First, and perhaps foremost, is the fact that 
many of appellant's claims are currently pending in a 
separate case in the Fourth District Court, thus robbing 
the Sixth District Court of subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the claims. Second, however, is the fact that 
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appellant's claims sound exclusively in tort, and venue is 
therefore proper only in the Fourth District Court• The 
appellant's simple prayer for the relief of quiet title 
cannot, in and of itself, confer venue upon the Sixth 
District Court. 
The appeal taken by appellant in this case is 
arguably frivolous, but clearly taken for purpose of 
delay. Respondents urge, therefore, this Court to impose 
sanctions as provided by Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Respondents would further request 
the Court to view this appeal in light of Rule 10(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and summarily dismiss 
the appeal since it plainly does not present a substantial 
question for this Court to review. 
DATED this [I day of February, 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MICHAEL^E. DYER 
Attorney for Respond/^hts 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" — Plaintiff's Complaint 
Exhibit "B" — Defendants' Memorandum in case pending 
between the parties in Fourth District 
Court, State of Utah 
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HOWARD F. HATCH 
P. 0. BOX 190 
PROVO, UT 84603 
377-3400/3440 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF KANE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, and WILLIAM 
G. DYER, individually and as 
General Partners for REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS. 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. 2J)S£> 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendants are residents of the State of Utah. 
2. The real property which is the subject of this action is located 
entirely within'the'confines of Kane- County, Utah. 
3. That the Defendants have attempted to perform, and in fact have 
performed, certain illegal acts on behalf of the Limited Partnership 
known as REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, by and through their 
attorney, Michael E. Dyer, to wit: contracting with third parties 
for the sale of partnership property without legal authority to do so. 
4. That in so doing, the Defendants have jeopardized the financial 
interests of the Plaintiff and other limited partners, for which 
the Plaintiff feels responsible as the legitimate General Partner 
for said partnership. 
5. That the Defendants have asked for a dissolution of the subject 
Limited Partnership in an action filed with the Fourth Judicial Court, Civil 
No- 63,025, but have allowed matters in that court to languish in an effort 
to take over the assets of the partnership and do with them as they wish; and 
have presumed,in the meantime, the right to appoint themselves as the general 
partners. 
6. That certain misrepresentations were made to limited partners 
blk 
in.effort to obtain support for a partnership takeover in November of 1984, 
whereby the Defendants claim to have become the true General Partners of the 
subject partnership. 
7. That said Defendants have indicated they intend to distribute 
partnership assets in a manner different than the partnership agreement pro-
vides or that state statute dictates, all to the great detrement of the 
Plaintiff. 
8. That the partnership owes the Plaintiff a substantial amount of 
money which is currently past due and payable and to which the Plaintiff is 
entitled. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays that this Court will grant to the 
Plaintiff the following: 
1. An accounting of moneys received by the Defendants while pre-
suming to act for and in behalf of the subject partnership. 
2. An injunction against further usurpation by the Defendants of 
the rights of the Plaintiff to act as the General Partner of REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, or in the alternative, 
3. A judgment against the Defendants both individually and as 
the General Partners for the subject Limited Partnership, if they are deter-
mined to be the legally authorized general partners, in an amount equal to 
. . i r ' J L ' /bts ~* +wr m^nership + r t!v- ^ I ' l i ' ; r r bell- c^ 5,o : .? approximately 
^50,-. , , . ] . • • 'Wenrar" -^SPGC 
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4 > \ ^ • 
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DAi^J vdxS SQ{?\ day of January, 1985. 
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Limited Partnership. 
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Hatch, aware of this particular provision in the limited 
partnership agreement, made numerous and substantial "advances" 
to the limited partnership Real Estate Development Consultants 
during Mr. Hatch's tenure as general partner of the partner-
ship. According to Utah's statutory formula, the limited 
partners are and should be given priority over said "advances" 
upon dissolution of the partnership. Otherwise, a general 
partner could forward enough "advances" to the partnership to 
insure that only he would receive or have a claim to any of the 
assets from the partnership, precluding any recovery at all by 
any of the limited partners. In other words, if defendant 
Hatch has his way, the limited partners will lose all of their 
statutory protection and will come out on the very sho^ rt end of 
the bargain as far as the partnership assets are concerned. 
The State of Oklahoma has had opportunity to consider 
an almost identical situation to that of the present case. 
In Dycus v. Belco Industries, Inc., 569 P.2d 553 (Okla.App. 
1977), Belco, the general partner, sold all of the limited 
partnership assets and, upon dissolution, attempted to retain 
its "advances" made to the partnership in preference to the 
claims of the limited partners. The Court discussed the issue 
as follows: 
Next, defendants contend Belco's [the 
general partner's] loans should be repaid 
prior to any return of capital contribu-
tions to limited partners. Their theory 
is premised on provisions of the Articles 
of Limited Partnership which state that 
any "advances" by either limited or 
general partners are to be deemed loans to 
and debts of the partnership, and further 
that upon dissolution, the partnership is 
first to repay all debts. This means, 
according to defendants, that since Dycus 
made no advances, Belco's loans must be 
repaid ahead of any return to plaintiff of 
his capital contributions. 
This reasoning is unsound, 
tual terms relied upon by B 
conflict with the provision 
Uniform Limited PartnershiD 
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heir propor-
ts in return of 
follows 
ers. 
(Emphasis in original). 
Confronted with this same type of dispute as in the 
instant case, the Court in Dycus, held as follows: 
We hold, then that Belco's claim for 
advances must take a statutory place 
behind creditors and limited partners. As 
to money paid as capital contributions, 
however, one who is both a limited and 
general partner is subject to all res-
trictions of a general partner except in 
respect to his limited partner contri-
bution. 54 O.S. 1971 §153. Therefore, 
Belco is entitled to repayment on a parity 
with plaintiff to the extent of the 
qualified portion of its limited partner 
contr ibution. 
Based upon the above-referenced statutes and case 
law, it is unmistakable that a limited partner is to receive 
statutory protection from a general partner with respect to the 
distribution of partnership assets upon dissolution. Plain-
tiffs respectfully submit, therefore, that they should receive 
said protection upon dissolution of Real Estate Development 
Consultants and the distribution of its assets. Inasmuch as 
the determination of the distribution of partnership assets is 
3 matter of law, and since Utah's statutes appear clear on this 
issue, plaintiffs respectfully move for partial summary 
judgment as to their Fifth Cause of Action regarding the proper 
method for distributing partnership assets upon dissolution. 
DATED this I X
 d a v of October. 1983. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
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Michael"E. Dyer 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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